He starts out by conceding practically everything critics of intervention have been saying, but then he continues…
“However, even if our Syria policy isn't about achieving something good, we should still be thinking about what we can do that reduces the chances of things getting catastrophically worse.”I have become wary of foreign interventions, but this made me stop and think:
“Aiding the less ugly, less bad guys in the Syrian resistance, and even finding a few actual good guys to support, isn't about installing a pro-American government in post civil war Syria. It’s about minimizing the prospects for a worst-case scenario—by shortening the era of conflict and so, hopefully, reducing the radicalization of the population and limiting the prospects that Syrian society as a whole will descend into all-out chaotic massacres and civil conflict.”
“And it’s about making sure that other people in Syria, unsavory on other grounds as they may be, who don’t like al-Qaeda type groups and don’t want them to establish a permanent presence in the country, have enough guns and ammunition to get their way.”I don’t know if any of those goals are achievable, but if it screws Iran out of an important ally and cuts them off from the Levant where their Hezbos are stationed, it’s a good thing. I also buy the argument that the longer the conflict drags out, the more radicalized the population becomes, making things unmanageable for perhaps generations.
“This is now all about trying to prevent the worst rather than promoting the best.”The situation is already out of control. Short of direct intervention, should we try to shape it for the least bad outcome?
Before answering, please read Francois Heisbourg's case for intervention.
